[Commlist] CFP Big Tech as an Actor of Global Security and Geopolitical Conflicts

****
*Big Tech as an Actor of Global Security and Geopolitical Conflicts 
conference, 2-3 May 2024, Paris* - *CfP deadline reminder + keynote 
announcements*

As a reminder, the international conference "Big Tech as an Actor of 
Global Security and Geopolitical Conflicts" (CARISM/CIS/IRSEM) will take 
place on May 2 and 3, 2024, at the Panthéon Center in Paris.

The CfP is available here https://bigtechinsec.sciencesconf.org/ 
<https://bigtechinsec.sciencesconf.org/>, along with proposed themes, 
key dates, and submission guidelines. Proposals are due by December 5, 
2023, and should be sent to the following address 
(bigtechinsec /at/ protonmail.com) <mailto:(bigtechinsec /at/ protonmail.com)>.

We are also delighted to announce the participation of Ron Deibert 
<https://deibert.citizenlab.ca/bio/>, Anna Leander 
<https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/academic-departments/faculty/anna-leander>, 
and Ilan Manor <https://cris.bgu.ac.il/en/persons/ilan-manor> as keynote 
speakers.

+++

Call for Proposals

From the war in Ukraine to geopolitical rivalries between China and the 
USA, and terrorism-related threats, the digital giants colloquially 
known as “Big Tech” corporations are increasingly involved in issues of 
national and international security.

Most often, their involvement stems from their services and platforms 
serving as new theaters of conflict in cyberspace (Singer & Brooking, 
2018), as with Russian or Chinese information operations on social media 
during elections (Jeangène Vilmer et al., 2018; Charon & Jeangène 
Vilmer, 2021; Marangé & Quessard 2021); or when Donald Trump, then 
President of the United States, took to Twitter to threaten North Korea 
with nuclear war (Schwartz, 2022). In such cases, the role of Big Tech 
companies in conflict is an infrastructural, near invisible one, as the 
services they provide and govern are used as intermediaries for conflict 
(Musiani et al. 2016). In other cases, these firms are themselves the 
objects of conflict, as with the multiple bans on Huawei's 5G (Statista, 
2020) and on the social network TikTok owned by Chinese conglomerate 
ByteDance (Chan, 2023); or Russia's designation of Meta as a "terrorist" 
organization in the context of the Ukraine war (Euronews, 2022). In 
International Relations scholarship, it is commonly assumed that private 
corporations act as “ambassadors” of their country of origin and that 
their technical innovations are prolongations of national power on the 
world stage (Carr, 2016; Strange, 1996; Keohane & Nye, 1998). It 
therefore comes as no surprise that conflict situations involving Big 
Tech are becoming more common with the internationalization of Chinese 
internet giants, signaling the emergence of non-American Big Tech. 
Meanwhile, tech giants’ political power is increasingly recognized by 
the traditional actors of international affairs, with multiple states 
naming “tech ambassadors”. Finally, Big Tech companies are increasingly 
becoming actors of global security in their own right, by “co-producing” 
security alongside public authorities (Bellanova & de Goede, 2022) and 
even in some cases launching their own initiatives, such as Microsoft’s 
Digital Geneva Convention, or YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Microsoft’s 
launch of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) in 2017.

While it is not unprecedented for private companies to be involved in 
security issues, policymaking and enforcement (Abrahamsen & Leander, 
2016), and especially so in cyberspace (Dunn Cavelty, 2016), the variety 
and importance of current ties between digital giants, security and 
conflict seems to indicate a general trend towards the privatization of 
security through these (quasi-) global players. Due to their scale and 
economic clout, Big Tech companies profit from a particular form of 
“entrepreneurial private authority” (Srivastava, 2021)  or “platform 
power” (Culpepper & Thelen, 2020). In practice, this notably means a 
privileged access to public authorities and international fora, and the 
ability to impose standards ("best practices", definitions, processes), 
as well as to form coalitions to defend their interests. As its central 
position in the digital industry and economy is being translated into a 
centrality in security-related policy areas, Big Tech can leverage its 
integration within security governance networks and geopolitical 
rivalries to fend off threats of antitrust action (Woll, 2019), thereby 
consolidating its market power and becoming further integrated into high 
politics, raising multiple concerns in terms of legitimacy, 
accountability, and sovereignty (Monsees et al., 2023).

Such developments invite us to look beyond the instrumental study of Big 
Tech platforms, services and technologies, and to turn our attention to 
the agency of these actors in global security and geopolitical 
conflicts. With this in mind, the aim of this conference is to initiate 
a holistic discussion on the diversity of the security roles played by 
these companies, how they “learn to see the world through a security 
lens” (de Goede, 2018:26) and their relationship to traditional security 
networks. A number of disciplinary perspectives and fields of study are 
relevant to this theme, and the goal is to bring together their 
respective contributions. This conference will be of relevance for, and 
expects contributions from, a range of disciplines including but not 
limited to international relations, political science, media studies, 
security studies, science and technology studies and political economy.
1.     Big Tech in transnational conflicts and social movements

How do Big Tech companies position themselves or try to remain neutral 
when their services are used during armed conflicts or insurrections? We 
seek to understand how companies shape their ‘crisis response’, both in 
relation to international conflicts, where Big Tech takes a stand for 
one country against another (or avoids taking a stand altogether), and 
to local conflicts where one party seems to be favored by Big Tech in 
the context of social movements.
a.       Transnational conflicts

Facebook/Meta’s communication on the subject is clearly the most open 
one, ever since it was formally accused by the UN of contributing to the 
Rohingya genocide in Myanmar (Whitten-Woodring et al., 2020). Following 
the Rohingya scandal, in 2019 Facebook created a Strategic Response Team 
(Meta, 2019) with a mission to operate global watch of international 
conflicts to better adapt its services’ features and avoid escalating 
the situation on site. Five years since its launch, the team’s 
efficiency remains hard to measure, while its functioning itself is 
quite vague. It appears that conflicts are still handled by the company 
on an ad hoc basis. Since its launch, Meta’s Oversight Board insists on 
the need for a specific conflict management policy that is seemingly 
being developed but is yet to come into effect (Oversight Board, 2022).

The company has also adapted its content policy in Eastern Europe 
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Meta, 2022), and in 
Afghanistan after the US army left the country and the Taliban regained 
power (The New York Times, 2023). In other conflicts, namely in Ethiopia 
or during frequent clashes between Israel and Palestine, Meta is 
regularly accused (including by its own Oversight Board) of being too 
passive or the other way around, of ruthless censorship of certain 
parties to the conflict (notably Palestinian voices) (Human Rights 
Watch, 2022).

According to recent studies (Kaneva et al., 2023), the role of social 
media in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is quite unprecedented, with 
Ukraine using social media to crowdfund the war and creating an IT army 
(Manor, 2023). On a more personal level, the new owner of Twitter (X) 
Elon Musk taking a clear stand on the Ukraine conflict and sending 
Starlink Internet drones to Ukraine caused controversy as well (Twitter, 
2022). As far as Google is concerned, a recent study shows the 
introduction of bias and manipulation in search engine results in favor 
of pro-Kremlin sources for Ukraine-related requests made from Russia 
(Novaya Gazeta, 2023), in what can only be described as a 
counterintuitive move, given that these same sources are blocked by the 
company on YouTube.
b.      Social movements

Big Tech companies’ role in social movements became clear during the 
“Arab Springs”, with Facebook playing a defining role (Wolsfeld, 2013), 
while social media affordances allowing transnational connections and 
global support for local causes go as far back as the Zapatista movement 
in the nineties (Russel, 2005).

Traditionally, social media are viewed as facilitating social movements’ 
development, without, however, guaranteeing their efficiency (Tufekci, 
2019). On the other hand, Access Now claims that Big Tech’s sanctions 
against Russia have a negative impact on Russian civil society (Access 
Now, 2022).

Partisan conflicts between the right and left are also of relevance when 
they generate violence. A telling case in this regard was President 
Donald Trump's suspension from all mainstream social media platforms in 
January 2021 following the Capitol attack. The move fueled accusations 
of “wokeness” (Sobande et al., 2022) and censorship, leading to a 
notable growth of existing alt-right platforms and the creation of new 
ones (including Trump’s own, Truth Social). In response, Apple and 
Google (Android) banned the most libertarian services from their app 
stores for failing to protect their users, while Amazon (AWS) kicked 
them off of its cloud services -- a phenomenon that has been called 
“deplatformization” (van Dijck et al., 2021).
2.     Big Tech and everyday “trust and safety”

While moments of crisis concentrate exceptional threats over a short 
period of time, platform companies must also deal with safety and 
security issues that are ongoing. These include threats related to 
terrorism and violent extremisms (Borelli, 2021), disinformation and 
hate speech (Badouard, 2021), and organized crime. How do Big Tech 
companies integrate security considerations into their respective 
product development processes, platform governance and internal 
organization?

As security and safety-related scrutiny and demands from public 
authorities and users grow, Big Tech companies are increasingly forced 
to respond in order to adapt to multiplying regulations, and/or to 
preempt scandals and new projects to regulate them. In the European 
Union, the DSA notably mandates that VLOPs assess the “systemic risks” 
associated with their services and deploy mitigation strategies. As Big 
Tech adapts to these new roles, its products evolve. Visible changes in 
the name of safety include, for instance, prominent reporting buttons, 
ReDirect links, fact-checking labels or ‘sensitive content’ warnings on 
Facebook, YouTube’s information panels for Covid content or state-owned 
media, or Twitter (X)’s “are you sure you want to retweet this without 
having opened the link first” pop-up. Other adaptations which are more 
opaque to end users bring out questions of censorship (Badouard, 2020), 
such as the formation of “content cartels” (Douek, 2020)[1] and other 
industry standard-setting mechanisms[2], the deployment of “automated” 
moderation (Gorwa et al., 2020) or 
delisting/downranking/demonetization[3] (Goldman, 2021).

From the point of view of civil society organizations and individuals, 
platform design and affordances are particularly salient. For instance, 
the availability of strong encryption on given services can contribute 
to protecting users from authoritarian regimes. However, measures 
implemented in the name of user safety also have unforeseen 
externalities: encryption can complicate the investigative process for 
security services, seemingly neutral platform design choices were shown 
to favor conservative viewpoints (Schradie, 2019), while some content 
moderation policies disproportionately affect certain vulnerable groups’ 
right to free expression (Common, 2020), such as LGBTQ+ activists 
(Grison & Julliard, 2022), or journalists documenting war crimes (Human 
Rights Watch, 2020). Meanwhile, actors who are deplatformed hone their 
camouflage techniques (Renaut, 2020; Criezis, 2023) or migrate to 
services lacking the human and/or technical capacity or the willingness 
(small, encrypted and/or alt-right platforms, Fediverse) to moderate 
their services (Conway, 2020). The most extreme individuals then find 
themselves in spaces where they are less likely to be contradicted, and 
where it is more difficult for the authorities to monitor them, hence a 
lively debate on deplatforming and its efficiency. How do the Big Tech 
arbitrate between freedom of speech, user safety and national security 
concerns, all the while balancing them with their commercial interests ?

As technology companies appropriate these new considerations, their 
sociology as organizations is also evolving. The hiring of experts, 
often with previous backgrounds in academia or law enforcement roles is 
an important aspect of this adaptation, given that those companies’ 
cultures traditionally favor engineering roles (Frenkel & Kang, 2021). 
Public-facing Public Policy and Government Affairs teams are tasked with 
responding to ever-increasing demands from public authorities and 
regulators, while behind-the-scenes Product Policy and Trust & Safety 
teams develop rules, plan for use cases involving so-called “bad actors” 
and mitigate recurring threats. For social media corporations like 
YouTube (Google) and Meta, large numbers of content moderators to 
enforce policies --usually subcontractors—are a key part of the equation 
as well (Roberts, 2019). What means are these staff given to conduct 
their mission, and how do they make themselves heard by upper 
management? Despite all the evidence that safety, in particular through 
content moderation, is what makes (or breaks) the value of a platform 
(Gillespie, 2018), Frances Haugen’s testimony and recent layoffs appear 
to show that these teams are still seen as adjustment variables which 
are peripheral to the ‘core (engineering-based) business’ of Big Tech, 
thereby questioning the industry’s capacity for collective learning. A 
noteworthy development in this regard is the move towards a 
structuration of ‘trust and safety’ as a new professional field, with 
the emergence of a Trust and Safety Professional Association (TSPA) to 
advance the interests of these professionals within Silicon Valley.


3.     Big Tech and digital sovereignty

Never in history has it been clearer than today: digital 
infrastructures, from the physical ones (submarine cables, data centers, 
Internet Exchange Points) to the “logical” ones (protocols such as 
TCP/IP or algorithms such as Google’s PageRank) are crucial components 
in arrangements of power. Thus, the private entities that design these 
infrastructures and keep them operational, as well as leverage them for 
their profit, are key actors in these arrangements of power (DeNardis, 
2012; Easterling, 2014; Amoore, 2018; Möllers, 2021).

Indeed, Big Tech actors are the designers and de facto “governors” of 
the infrastructures that influence the field of possibilities for actors 
of international security. These infrastructures are doubly relevant, 
because on the one hand, the private actors who manage them follow their 
own agendas and on the other hand, they act as vectors for the political 
and cultural soft power of the states where they are situated; in both 
dimensions, stark conflicts can emerge. In some instances, such private 
actors can even be likened to technical “standards entrepreneurs”, as 
was the case during the controversy surrounding Huawei as a provider of 
5G technology.

For states, particularly in Europe (e.g. Tréguer, 2017), but also in 
Russia and China (e.g. Budnitsky & Jia, 2018), and other BRICS countries 
such as India (Gurumurthy & Chami, 2016) Big Tech services raise 
questions related to “digital sovereignty” (Pohle & Thiel, 2020). While 
this label is primarily understood to indicate a legal concept and a set 
of political discourses, digital sovereignty can also be understood as a 
set of infrastructures and socio-material practices; the concept of 
sovereignty is re-defined today by a number of political and economic 
projects which aim to establish autonomous digital infrastructures in a 
hyperconnected world (Musiani, 2022).

Manifold examples in recent history illustrate this, such as when 
European or Russian governments host security-defense data at AWS, use 
Palantir software, or, as mentioned, debate the security soundness of 5G 
technology provided by Huawei. Finally, regulatory efforts from public 
institutions sometimes clash with geopolitical considerations, showing 
the ever more complex relationship between states and platforms. For 
example, the American peregrinations of TikTok show that, on one hand, 
the United States is also concerned about digital sovereignty when the 
hegemony of its champions is compromised; and on the other hand, digital 
sovereignty issues concern both the lower layers of cyberspace and the 
surface of the web and the application layer, as shown by data 
protection and disinformation issues.
4. Big Tech and its relations to traditional security actors

In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed the extent of long-suspected ties 
between Big Tech firms and the US security apparatus, as leaked 
documents showed that all major US commercial online service providers 
participated in the NSA’s global PRISM surveillance program. Ties 
between the American public sector and the tech industry on security 
issues are prolific and multifaceted, spanning over the whole spectrum 
of defense, intelligence and law enforcement. They range from strategic 
R&D investments and service contracts which can be considered part of 
the US military-industrial complex, to informal relations on foreign 
policy and law enforcement (Lakier, 2021), and punctual staged or real 
resistance[4] (Tréguer, 2019; Thibout, 2021). A decade after the Snowden 
affair, what do we know of public-private relations between Big Tech and 
the American security apparatus ?

Beyond the US, the Big Tech firms have also had to develop relations to 
security and foreign policy bureaucracies in the various regions of the 
world where they operate. Vice versa, some states have named “tech 
ambassadors” (Denmark, France, etc.) and the EU opened a permanent 
office in the Silicon Valley in 2022. In the European Union, intense 
public pressure around the question of terrorist uses of the internet 
has led to the establishment of new norms and permanent fora for 
public-private cooperation at the national and regional levels[5], 
through which security is “co-produced” across public-private boundaries 
(Bellanova & de Goede, 2022). But sometimes, public authorities 
themselves constitute the threat, and the UN’s public recognition of 
Facebook and WhatsApp’s role in the Rohingya genocide has also posed the 
pressing question of how these firms should proceed in cases where their 
users need protection from their own government.

Lastly, Big Tech is also becoming further integrated within the existing 
multilateral international security governance landscape, for instance 
by participating in United Nations Security Council, G7 or G20 meetings. 
Here, Microsoft stands out due to its longstanding presence at the UN, 
where it maintains a permanent office and is particularly involved in 
cybersecurity governance (Hurel & Lobato, 2018; Fairbank, 2019).

How do national and international bureaucracies and regulators manage 
their relationship to the Big Tech corporations in security-related 
domains? How do they organize to navigate these relationships? How is 
the political division of labor negotiated, and what are the power 
dynamics within the novel “assemblages” of networked security governance 
(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010) involving Big Tech? The salience of these 
questions increases as Big Tech becomes further integrated into global 
security governance, but such public-private relationships are 
especially difficult to investigate because of the cultures of secrecy 
and opacity traditional to both security bureaucracies and Big Tech. 
Leaks, scandals and transparency efforts (voluntary or mandated) provide 
periodic glances into their workings, and recent scholarship also shows 
that revolving door phenomena and public tendering records can provide 
fruitful insights (Tréguer, 2019; Thibout, 2021; Valdivia et al., 2022).

[1] Examples include the GIFCT on terrorist content, the Tech Coalition 
for child sexual abuse materials (CSAM), or the informal group to secure 
the 2020 US election from foreign interference (Isaac & Conger, 2020).

[2] For instance the Digital Trust and Safety Partnership.

[3] This last ‘freedom of speech, not freedom of reach’ approach is 
particularly favored by X (formerly Twitter) owner Elon Musk.

[4] Some of the publicized conflicts between the US administration and 
Big Tech have included privacy-related debates (for instance Apple’s 
refusal to break encryption on the San Bernardino terrorists’ iPhone), 
conducting business in China and periodical resistance from Big Tech 
staff on specific contracts (e.g. in 2018 with Google employees’ vocal 
resistance to Project Maven, or when Microsoft employees protested a 
contract with ICE over Trump’s immigration policies).

[5] See for instance the Groupe de contact permanent in France, or at EU 
level, the EU Internet Forum and Europol’s Internet Referral Unit 
(Vieth, 2019).


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