[Commlist] CFP - Fringe democracy and platformization of the public sphere (special issue ComPol)

*Call for Papers – Special Issue ComPol - Comunicazione Politica - n. 
1/2025 (April 2025)*

*Title*
Fringe democracy and platformization of the public sphere

*Guest editors*
Giovanni Boccia Artieri (University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Italy)
Axel Bruns (Queensland University of Technology, Australia)
Ehsan Dehghan (Queensland University of Technology, Australia)
Laura Iannelli (University of Sassari, Italy)

*Description*
The contemporary landscape of digital communication is characterized by 
a complex interplay of public, semi-public, and private spaces (Boccia 
Artieri et al., 2021). These digital spaces differ in terms of 
visibility, regulation, and participation, but they are interconnected 
through reciprocal migration dynamics between “fringe” and mainstream 
digital media. Fringe platforms (de Winkel, 2023) are alternative 
platform services which explicitly contest the ideological premises and 
the practices of mainstream platforms. These platforms can offer diverse 
types of service (e.g., social media, streaming service, Appstore), 
express diverse ideologies (e.g., far-right, anarchist, 
anti-authoritarian positions), and put forward criticisms of various 
kinds (e.g., contesting Big Tech’s personal data policies and 
accumulated power, advocating for diverse types of moderation, 
requesting to give voice to disadvantaged communities) (de Winkel, 2023; 
Herasimenka, 2022). These alternative digital spaces – at once 
technical, cultural, and social – are connected to disinformation 
ecosystems, to the spread of hate speech, and to the normalization of 
populist and extremist thought (Schulze et al., 2022; Walther & McCoy, 
2021). Furthermore, despite their potential ideological variety, some 
scholars highlight the existence of a relationship of co-dependency and 
interdependence between the rise of alternative digital spaces and the 
growth of discursive forms associated with the far-right (e.g., Marwick 
et al., 2022; Schulze et al., 2022; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2024; Urman & 
Katz, 2022).

For many years, fringe positions have leveraged the distribution power 
of mainstream social media platforms as “neutral channels,” becoming 
part of the broader public debate, altering the very nature of political 
discussion, and destroying the conditions of the public sphere (Esau et 
al., 2023). With the term “fringe democracy,” we refer to systems, 
practices, and political movements that exist on the periphery of 
traditional democratic norms and values, a “democracy from the margins” 
that tends to become increasingly visible in the online public sphere 
today. It can involve entities or political groups operating within a 
democratic framework but advocating for extreme or unconventional 
ideologies and methods of governance/participation. Fringe democracies 
often challenge or diverge from established democratic principles such 
as pluralism, inclusivity, respect for minority rights, and adherence to 
the rule of law. The main characteristics of fringe democracy are:

  * Extremist ideologies: movements or parties that may hold radical
    views significantly diverging from traditional political thought,
    such as ultranationalism, (anti-)authoritarianism, anarchism, or
    radical populism.
  * Marginalization from traditional politics: marginal democratic
    groups are typically sidelined from mainstream political discourse
    and may have limited influence within the broader political system.
    They often attract a smaller, more radicalized segment of the
    population.
  * Questionable democratic practices: although they may participate in
    democratic processes such as elections, their commitment to
    democratic principles like fair play, tolerance, and dialogue may be
    weak. They might employ tactics that undermine democratic
    institutions or the electoral process.
  * Controversial policies and rhetoric: these groups often advocate
    controversial or provocative policies that can polarize society.
    Their rhetoric may target specific groups, promoting division and
    sometimes inciting hatred or violence.
  * Potential for destabilization: by challenging the norms and values
    of traditional democracy, fringe democratic movements can contribute
    to political instability.

The concept of fringe democracy is increasingly linked to the 
transformation driven by the platformization of the media system (van 
Dijck et al., 2018), which indicates a process by which digital 
platforms’ logics transform the communicative dynamics of politics and 
the public sphere.
In particular, the relationship between the platformization of the 
public sphere and fringe democracy extends along several paths to be 
explored:

  * Amplification of marginal voices and mobilization: Digital platforms
    provide fringe groups with powerful tools to disseminate their
    ideologies and messages. Social media, in particular, allows these
    groups to reach a global audience, bypassing traditional
    “gatekeepers” such as mainstream media and political institutions.
    Online platforms also enable marginal groups to organize and
    mobilize more efficiently. This has led to rapid growth and greater
    visibility for fringe movements, which can influence political
    agendas and public discourse.
  * Growth of polarization and overexposure to marginal thinking: In
    digital environments, users are primarily exposed to information and
    viewpoints that reinforce their existing beliefs (dynamics of filter
    bubbles and echo chambers), which could accentuate polarization.
    This can intensify radical opinions and make fringe ideologies
    appear more widespread and accepted than they actually are in
    society at large.
  * Disinformation and propaganda: The platformization process has
    facilitated the spread of disinformation and propaganda. Fringe
    groups often exploit these mechanisms to disseminate false or
    misleading information, manipulate public opinion, increase the
    toxicity of the discursive dimension, and discredit traditional
    democratic institutions and processes.
  * Global reach and creation of fringe networks: Online platforms
    connect like-minded individuals across borders, allowing for the
    creation of transnational fringe networks. This global reach
    increases their influence and ability to share strategies,
    resources, and support.
  * Alternative media ecosystems: Online platforms have enabled the
    creation of alternative media ecosystems where fringe groups can
    produce and distribute their content. These ecosystems often operate
    independently of the oversight and standards of traditional media,
    which can lead to the proliferation of extreme and unverified content.
  * Monetization and funding: Many digital platforms offer monetization
    options, such as ad revenue, crowdfunding, and donations, which
    fringe groups can exploit to fund their activities. This financial
    support can sustain and grow their activities beyond what would be
    possible with traditional means.

In summary, the process of platformization has significantly transformed 
the landscape of fringe democracy by enhancing the reach, organization, 
and impact of fringe groups. Understanding these dynamics is essential 
for investigating some of the central themes in political communication 
studies, such as the quality of the public sphere, the influence of 
media on the political agenda and mobilization practices, the 
relationship between the media ecosystem and political polarization, and 
the processes of mis/disinformation. However, the study of marginal 
groups and radical counter-platforms that are difficult for researchers 
to access also poses several methodological challenges (Jost et al., 
2023; Peeters & Willaert, 2022; Rogers, 2020).

We invite submissions that address topics including, but not limited to, 
the following:

  * the role of fringe platforms in the platformized public sphere and
    in the contemporary media ecosystem
  * strategies of amplification of marginal voices and the influence of
    this greater visibility on political agendas
  * practices of online global mobilization and funding of marginal
    radical groups
  * spaces of communication consistent with fringe ideologies and
    political polarization
  * fringe platforms, disinformation, manipulation, incivility, and
    propaganda
  * narratives, imaginaries, public discussion on fringe platforms


*Information for authors*
Potential contributors should submit an extended abstract in English 
(1,200 words, excluding references), a 100-word bio, and the 
corresponding author’s contact information. Long abstracts must be sent 
by July 30, 2024 (torivista /at/ compol.it) <mailto:(rivista /at/ compol.it)>.Please 
indicate that the proposal is for the “special issue 2025” in the email 
subject.Notifications will be communicated by 3 September 2024. After 
the abstracts have been selected, authors will be invited to submit a 
full paper. Please note that acceptance of an abstract does not 
guarantee publication, given that all papers will go through the 
journal’s peer review process. No payment from the author(s) will be 
required for publication.

*Abstract structure*
The extended abstract should present a coherent narrative on fringe 
democracy and platformization of the public sphere, while highlighting 
how the authors respond to the special issue call. The abstract should 
clearly describe the key questions, the theoretical and methodological 
approach, the evidence presented, and the wider implications of the 
study. Authors are encouraged to provide as much detail as possible 
about the spatial and temporal context of their study, the research 
design and methods employed, the data collected, and the main results of 
the analyses. For theoretical works, the abstract should provide a clear 
and in-depth description of the conceptual framework.

*Key dates*
• Deadline for extended abstract submissions:July 30, 2024
• Decision by issue editors sent by:September 3, 2024
• Full paper submissions:November 3, 2024
• First round of reviews completed by:December 15, 2024
• Resubmissions of papers:January 15, 2025
• Second round of reviews completed by:January 30, 2025
• Submission of final manuscripts:February 15, 2025

See the full CFP 
here:https://www.rivisteweb.it/issn/1594-6061/newsdetail/393 
<https://www.rivisteweb.it/issn/1594-6061/newsdetail/393>

For further information about the submission process, please contact the 
editorial team:
Giovanni Boccia Artieri ((giovanni.bocciaartieri /at/ uniurb.it) 
<mailto:(giovanni.bocciaartieri /at/ uniurb.it)>)
Axel Bruns ((a.bruns /at/ qut.edu.au) <mailto:(a.bruns /at/ qut.edu.au)>)
Ehsan Dehghan ((e.dehghan /at/ qut.edu.au) <mailto:(e.dehghan /at/ qut.edu.au)>)
Laura Iannelli ((liannelli /at/ uniss.it) <mailto:(liannelli /at/ uniss.it)>)

*About the venue*
*Editor in Chief*: Augusto Valeriani (University of Bologna)
Comunicazione Politica (ComPol) – founded in 2000 and published by Il 
Mulino since 2009 – is sponsored by the Italian Association of Political 
Communication. It is well established among the academic and scientific 
community as the leading Italian journal that studies, analyzes and 
discusses the relationships between media and politics. The journal 
welcomes all research methods, comparative perspectives and analytical 
articles that deal with emerging political communication topics in Italy 
and worldwide. ComPol aims at promoting the interdisciplinary 
development of political communication scholarship by publishing 
contributions from political scientists, sociologists, mass 
communication and new media researchers, linguists, historians, and 
scholars from other disciplines. It features research on the deep 
transformations that have taken place in the electoral and political 
arenas in the last decades. The journal pays special attention also to 
the ongoing developments in the world of professions related to 
political communication: political marketing and consultancy, public 
affairs, polls, media management, and the like, with the aim of 
stimulating the discussion between academic research and professional 
work in crucial political environments. ComPol publishes articles both 
in Italian and
in English, encouraging submissions also from international scholars. 
All articles undergo under blind peer-review. The journal is indexed by: 
Scopus Bibliographic Database (Q2Communication 2024), ERIH Plus, 
Articoli italiani di periodici accademici (AIDA), JournalSeek, Essper, 
Catalogo italiano dei periodici (ACNP), Google Scholar, Primo Central 
(Ex Libris), EDS (EBSCO).
https://www.rivisteweb.it/issn/1594-6061/presentazione 
<https://www.rivisteweb.it/issn/1594-6061/presentazione>

*(cited) References*
Boccia Artieri, G., Brilli, S., & Zurovac, E. (2021). Below the radar: 
Private groups, locked platforms, and ephemeral content—Introduction to 
the special issue. Social Media+ Society, 7(1).
Esau, K., Choucair, T., Vilkins, S., Svegaard, S., Bruns, A., O'Connor 
Farfan, K., & Lubicz-Zaorski, C. (2023) Destructive political 
polarization in the context of digital communication: A critical 
literature review and conceptual framework. In International 
Communication Association (ICA) Annual Conference, issue 
73https://eprints.qut.edu.au/238775/ <https://eprints.qut.edu.au/238775/>
Herasimenka, A. (2022). Movement leadership and messaging platforms in 
preemptive repressive settings: Telegram and the Navalny Movement in 
Russia. Social Media+ Society, 8(3).
de Winkel, T. (2023). Fringe platforms: An analysis of contesting 
alternatives to the mainstream social media platforms in a platformized 
public sphere (Doctoral dissertation, Utrecht University)
Jost, P., Heft, A., Buehling, K., Zehring, M., Schulze, H., Bitzmann, 
H., & Domahidi, E. (2023). Mapping a Dark Space: Challenges in Sampling 
and Classifying Non-Institutionalized Actors on Telegram. M&K Medien & 
Kommunikationswissenschaft, 71(3-4), 212-229.
Marwick, A., Clancy, B., & Furl, K. (2022). Far-Right online 
radicalization: A review of the literature. The Bulletin of Technology & 
Public Life.
Peeters, S., & Willaert, T. (2022). Telegram and digital methods: 
Mapping networked conspiracy theories through platform affordances. M/C 
Journal, 25(1).
Rogers, R. (2020). Deplatforming: Following extreme Internet celebrities 
to Telegram and alternative social media. European Journal of 
Communication, 35(3), 213-229.
Schulze, H., Hohner, J., Greipl, S., Girgnhuber, M., Desta, I., & 
Rieger, D. (2022). Far-right conspiracy groups on fringe platforms: a 
longitudinal analysis of radicalization dynamics on Telegram. 
Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media 
Technologies, 28(4), 1103-1126.
Törnberg, A., & Törnberg, P. (2024). Intimate Communities of Hate: Why 
Social Media Fuels Far-Right Extremism. Taylor & Francis.
Urman, A., Katz, S. (2022) What they do in the shadows: examining the 
far-right networks on Telegram, Information, Communication & Society, 
25:7,904-923.
van Dijck, J., Poell, T., de Waal, M. (2018), The Platform Society: 
Public Values in a Connective World. Oxford University Press
Walther, S., McCoy, A. (2021). US extremism on Telegram: Fueling 
disinformation. Conspiracy Theories, and Accelerationism. Perspectives 
on Terrorism, 15(2), 100–124.

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